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Research Summary: The youth justice system in the
United States has always depended on nongovernmental
organizations to provide some of the services, supports,
and sanctions for youth after juvenile court adjudication.
As the use of state-operated youth confinement declined in
recent years, primarily as a result of falling rates of seri-
ous juvenile crime, the relative importance of private facil-
ities increased. The number of juveniles held in privately
operated secure confinement facilities is now larger than
the number confined in state institutions.
Policy Implications: Should policy makers be concerned
about a gradual shift from public to private secure facili-
ties? Certainly, some private facilities are poorly managed,
neglectful, and even abusive, but the same has always been
true for some public facilities. Effective policy and prac-
tice should be focused on the quality of interventions rather
than on their financial auspices. Quality youth justice sys-
tems (a) limit the use of confinement to cases where it is
objectively necessary, (b) ensure the health and safety of all
confined youth, (c) provide effective treatments and devel-
opmentally appropriate programming, and (d) continually
monitor and evaluate their effectiveness. These goals apply
to all forms of secure confinement regardless of financing
or organizational configuration.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Reformers and justice advocates see privately operated adult prisons as income generators for a self-
interested network of carceral entrepreneurs who pursue private gain while wrongly usurping the pun-
ishment power of the government. Some advocates aim these same criticisms at the juvenile justice
system. Is it appropriate for critics of private prisons to use the same arguments against the use of juve-
nile facilities and residential placements for court-ordered youth? If privately operated youth facilities
are inherently problematic, some important changes are needed in youth justice policy. As youth crime
rates began to fall across the country, many states reduced or even closed their large publicly operated
secure facilities. As a result, private facilities now make up a larger share of youth confinement space
in the United States.
According to the federal Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (Sickmund, Sladky, Kang, &
Puzzanchera, 2017), the number of adjudicated youths held in long-term secure facilities dropped 58%
between 1997 and 2015. National philanthropies and advocacy organizations characterize the trend
as evidence of “reform,” suggesting that cities and states across the country chose to limit their use
of confinement in the 1990s and to handle more youth in community-based programs. Advocates use
active verbs such as “cut,” “reduce,” and “slash” to describe the changes in youth confinement. A com-
mon observation is that states “reduced” their reliance on confinement, yet crime did not increase (e.g.,
Howell, Wilson, Sickmund, Hodges, & Howell, 2017, p. 28). The declining use of juvenile confine-
ment, however, was not simply the product of intentional reform. More likely, falling rates of serious
youth crime suppressed the demand for secure confinement in states that once made heavy use of such
facilities.
In 1993, a peak year for violent crime, police agencies nationwide reported ∼13 murder arrests
involving youth younger than 18 years of age for every 100,000 youth ages 10 to 17 in the population.
The murder arrest rate among youth then dropped 79% between 1993 and 2017 (Butts, 2018). Similarly,
youth arrests for robbery and aggravated assault fell 70% since their peak year in the mid-1990s. Other
offenses experienced similar decreases. Arrest rates for serious property crime plummeted 76%. The
youth arrest rate for weapon possession dropped 73%, whereas the drug offense arrest rate among
young people was 57% lower in 2017 than it was at the 1990s peak. States did not “decide” to use less
confinement. They just did not need as much confinement.
The notion that falling youth incarceration is a result of changes in crime rates rather than of inten-
tional reforms in policy and practice is also supported by trends in juvenile court dispositions.1 Juvenile
courts began committing fewer youth to confinement facilities because fewer youth were involved in
the types of court cases that expose them to confinement. As a percentage of juvenile court caseloads,
the use of residential placement has not changed much since the 1990s, whether one considers all delin-
quency cases or only those cases involving formal charges and adjudication. The use of out-of-home
placement, in fact, has been stable for two decades (Figure 1). In 1996, approximately 28% of adju-
dicated juvenile court cases ended with placement dispositions. Between 1996 and 2016, the use of
placement dipped slightly to 25% for several years and then rebounded to 27%.
In other words, juveniles adjudicated in delinquency proceedings are about as likely to be ordered
into confinement today as they were at the height of the juvenile crime scare of the mid-1990s. Juvenile
confinement numbers fell during the past two decades because the overall volume of cases referred to
juvenile courts changed, not because of changes in the handling of cases or as a result of reductions in
the use of confinement as a court disposition.
Not surprisingly, conventional wisdom about the juvenile justice system is often wrong. Another
example of conventional wisdom that could be wrong is the belief that private correctional facilities
are morally objectionable and possibly harmful for youth, their families, and communities. Among
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F I G U R E 1 Percentage of juvenile court cases resulting in court-ordered placement declined only slightly
between 1996 and 2016 [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. Data extracted from easy access to juvenile court statistics (Sickmund et al., 2017)
liberal advocates, the condemnation of private prisons has become a standard applause line at politi-
cal events. All forms of private corrections are now subjected to increased scrutiny, and the facilities
for justice-involved youth are not exempt (Eisen, 2017a; Mendel, 2015; Schiraldi, 2015). The actual
effects of privatization, however, have yet to be studied thoroughly. Criminologists and criminal justice
researchers recommend in-depth investigations of justice privatization, and they suggest the problems
and possible benefits of privatization are more complex than advocates acknowledge.
Lindsey, Mears, and Cochran (2016), for example, indicated the value of privatization should be
assessed using seven dimensions: (1) the extent of need (i.e., unmet demand for space); (2) the amount
and quality of services available system wide; (3) the likely impact of privatization on outcomes, both
intended and unintended; (4) cost-efficiencies to be realized; (5) available support for the development
of innovative alternatives; (6) likely effects on social control; and (7) ethical considerations. Without
new research across the full range of these concerns, future debates about the privatization of adult
prisons are likely to be dominated by theoretical and ideological speculation. In the juvenile justice
context, policy makers, practitioners, and researchers should judge the value of private facilities using
facts rather than relying on ideology and rhetoric. Such assessments, should include an acknowledg-
ment of the distinct mission of juvenile justice, the long history of private youth facilities, and the key
questions of youth safety and treatment quality.
2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The role of secure confinement has always been controversial in the juvenile justice system. The Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899 established the first juvenile court in the United States, if not in the world.
During the next century, every other state adopted its own form of juvenile or family court and all
juvenile justice systems evolved in various ways. Throughout their first century, however, juvenile
justice systems tended to embrace two key strategies: rehabilitation and diversion (Zimring, 2000). The
adherence to these principles seemed more theoretical than practical at times, but the underlying legal
theories supporting the separate juvenile justice system were motivated by the knowledge that children
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and youth are still impressionable and not yet fully formed when compared with adults. Misbehavior
during adolescence is not a sufficient predictor of adult criminality.
Juvenile justice policy embraced the principle that not all acts of delinquency merit intervention.
Most young people are capable of maturing and desisting from crime without formal legal action.
Exposing young people to unnecessary contact with the juvenile court may increase the probability of
future justice involvement (Wilson & Hoge, 2012). Essentially, the juvenile court was invented not to
punish youth for their illegal behavior but to prevent normative patterns of adolescent law-breaking
from turning into lifetimes of adult crime. The juvenile justice mission was to restore each youth to a
prosocial course of development using a social services approach and to avoid punitive responses that
could undermine the effectiveness of intervention.
Confinement was still always part of the legal system’s response to youth. Even before the emer-
gence of juvenile justice, American courts sent recalcitrant youth to “houses of refuge,” which were a
combination of orphanages and work houses (Mennel, 1973; Rothman, 1980). Later known as “refor-
matories” and “training schools,” institutions for youth were a mainstay of the nation’s juvenile justice
system well into the twentieth century. It was not unusual for private organizations to supply institu-
tional space for court-involved youth, and most of the community-based programming for youth was
delivered by private agencies. Scholars often found little difference in the effectiveness of institutional
settings and privately operated programs in the community. Decades of research findings reveal that
when provided by competent private organizations, community-based interventions can achieve pub-
lic safety goals at least as well as confinement (Bonnie, Johnson, Chemers, & Schuck, 2013; Empey,
1978; Farrington, Ohlin, & Wilson, 1986; Sechrest, White, & Brown, 1979).
The preventive mission of juvenile justice was a product of its Progressive Era origins and the atten-
dant optimism about the legal system and its ability to change behavior and transform lives. The juvenile
justice system enthusiastically embraced parens patriae—that is, the state may be authorized to step
in and take the place of inadequate parenting when necessary to protect the health and well-being of
children. In their early years, juvenile courts eschewed the formal trappings and due process protections
of criminal (adult) courts. Juvenile court proceedings relied on informal practices and did not require
the presence of lawyers and juries (Feld, 2017).
As the United States entered the Civil Rights Era, however, many legal observers grew concerned
that the informal and discretionary practices of the juvenile system sometimes worked to the detriment
of youth, especially those from low-income families and communities of color. In two landmark cases,
the Supreme Court imposed greater formality on juvenile courts. A 1967 Supreme Court decision, In
re Gault (1967), required juvenile courts to adopt some adult-like procedures, including guaranteeing
the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Three years later, the Court’s In re Winship (1970) decision elevated the burden of proof in delinquency
proceedings to the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Essentially, the Court began to erode the
progressives’ hope that juvenile courts would reduce youthful misbehavior using only informal and
nonadversarial procedures. Despite its lofty ideals, the juvenile system was also capable of imposing
costs on youth akin to criminal sanctions.
Other Supreme Court decisions, however, sustained the idea of parens patriae. One year after Win-
ship, the Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) that juvenile defendants did not have a consti-
tutional right to jury trials. What mattered was “accurate fact-finding,” and juries were not considered
essential to the task. From the 1970s onward, the juvenile justice system continued to operate as a legal
hybrid. Juvenile case processing involved fewer rules and diminished procedural protections because
the goal of court action was to help youth avoid further legal consequences. Some restraints were nec-
essary, however, because it was clear that involving youth in the juvenile process could harm them
as well.
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The juvenile justice policy environment became even more complicated during the 1980s and 1990s.
Violent youth crime was increasing, and lawmakers and justice officials across the country feared
the public’s reaction. Elected officials launched rhetorical attacks against the juvenile justice system,
charging it with excessive lenience and an inability to respond to cases of violence (Butts & Mears,
2001). States began to change the ingredients of juvenile justice to blend in a bit of deterrence and
retribution to go along with the traditional mixture of incapacitation and rehabilitation. The new menu
included policies that transferred thousands of youth to criminal court for serious offenses and laws
that allowed juvenile court dispositions to be set categorically by legislatures rather than individually
by judges (Feld, 2017).
By the early 2000s, the “tough-on-crime” era of the 1980s and 1990s seemed to be coming to
an end. Juvenile justice policy once again openly embraced the historical mission of rehabilitation
and diversion. Many states endorsed efforts to improve the juvenile justice system’s ability to divert
youth from formal processing and to connect them with strong, community-based programs instead
(e.g., Daugaard, 2018; Inslee, 2018; Teigen, 2018). Some states, such as Connecticut, Illinois, and
Massachusetts, even began to explore the use of juvenile-court style procedures and interventions
with criminal court cases involving “emerging adults” ages 18 to 21 or even 24 as research findings
reveal that young adults may respond well to the developmentally oriented approach of youth justice
(Columbia Justice Lab, 2018; Kaufmann & Bischoff, 2017).
As discussed previously, however, the less punitive and newly rehabilitative era of juvenile justice
policy that emerged in the 2000s was at least partly rhetorical. The use of confinement was relatively
stable throughout the period. If policy is judged by actions and outcomes rather than by ideals, confine-
ment practices did not change significantly after the 1990s. The proportion of juvenile cases ending
in out-of-home placement was about the same in 2015 as it was in the 1990s. Fewer youth were being
placed, but the decline was a result of changes in the community—that is, youth crime rates were drop-
ping. The more important change was how states reacted to falling demand for confinement space. They
reduced and sometimes closed publicly operated confinement facilities while relying more on private
providers.
States always varied in their use of juvenile confinement facilities for young people. The extent of
confinement was never a simple and direct response to crime. It was at least partly a policy choice.
Some states invested heavily in youth confinement facilities, and in these jurisdictions, incarceration
became a key component of the youth justice response to youth crime. Other states could not afford to
run large confinement facilities or for other reasons preferred to depend on community-based programs,
reserving expensive out-of-home placement for the most serious and violent youth.
These choices were critical for budgets and for public safety. If officials spent too much on incar-
ceration, they inevitably lacked the resources to operate many of the community-based programs that
are essential to well-balanced youth justice systems. If they spent too little on confinement, they risked
political conflicts and harmful public relations if juvenile crime rates rose or if even one horrific crime
by a young person caused policy makers to question the legitimacy of the juvenile system. Maintain-
ing a workable balance of community-based programs and secure confinement was a critical focus of
decision making and policy development.
In the first decades of the 21st century, state and local governments faced two significant forces:
(1) public funds were in short supply as a result of the initial shock and ongoing effects of the
economic recession of 2008–2009; and (2) persuasive findings from studies on juvenile crime and
juvenile interventions were increasingly pointing to the public safety benefits of community-based
interventions and the unnecessary costs and risk of interventions involving secure confinement
(Bonnie et al., 2013). In combination, these forces resulted in encouraging juvenile justice systems to
react to falling crime rates by closing their large publicly operated confinement facilities and to rely
366 BUTTS AND PFAFF
more on community-based programs, including the many privately operated programs traditionally
used to supervise justice-involved youth.
For a brief period after the demand for secure confinement space began to drop, the juvenile justice
system seemed to respond by lowering the standards for confinement and placing youth in secure facili-
ties for less serious offenses (Butts, 2012). This strategy proved to be unstainable, however, when crime
rates continued to plunge across the country. Eventually, states reacted to falling demand by reducing
the supply of secure facilities and even closing some juvenile institutions. The total amount of secure
confinement space for juveniles was downsized, and state-operated institutions were affected more
than private facilities. As state-operated juvenile corrections facilities were depleted or even closed,
the privately operated facilities that remained naturally began to make up a larger share of the nation’s
youth confinement resources.
Is this an alarming development, or could it lead to more effective interventions and improved public
safety? What if juvenile crime rebounds at some point in the future? If more confinement space is
needed, will states build new publicly operated facilities, or will they have gained enough confidence
in private providers to rely on them during periods of growing demand for space?
3 PRIVATIZATION OF YOUTH JUSTICE
Privately operated facilities are not inherently incompatible with the rehabilitative mission of juvenile
justice. The juvenile court’s emphasis on rehabilitation has waxed and waned over the years, but the
system’s central or at least nominal reason for being has always been to intervene with youth at a young
age to redirect their social development toward healthy, prosocial adulthoods. This mission could be
achieved by well-managed and closely monitored private facilities. Some juvenile justice advocates,
however, are increasingly hostile to the presence of privately operated secure confinement facilities for
youth.
Privately operated prisons, and especially for-profit prisons, have attracted a considerable amount of
negative attention in recent years (Eisen, 2017a). New York’s Brennan Center for Justice characterized
private prisons as “ground zero in the anti-mass-incarceration movement” (Brennan Center for Justice,
n.d., para. 2). Juvenile justice activists joined the debate, aiming the same criticisms at the juvenile
corrections sector that are used against private (adult) prisons. The Institute for Policy Studies recently
published an interview with a well-known advocate titled “Who’s Profiting from America’s Private
Juvenile Prisons?” (Dolan, 2016). The National Juvenile Justice Network (NJJN) promulgated a formal
policy position on the issue, noting that “youth in trouble with the law are a public responsibility”
(NJJN Staff, 2015). In a recent report about the maltreatment of youth in all forms of large juvenile
institutions, the Annie E. Casey Foundation warned that a “stream of troubling reports about Florida
facilities has continued both in state-run facilities and in Florida’s sprawling network of privately run
facilities” (Mendel, 2015, p. 17). The Southwest Juvenile Defender Center also recently described one
company’s network of private facilities for youth as follows:
[A] horrific example of what happens when the government punts social services to pri-
vate entities with little subsequent oversight. Driven by their bottom line focus, [these]
facilities pay dismal wages to employees resulting in high staff turnover rates and leav-
ing inexperienced and poorly trained guards left to supervise juvenile populations. The
resulting conditions are dangerous and unsatisfactory; juveniles are subject to extensive
physical and sexual abuse, neglect, and deprivation, many times being forced to live in
abysmal conditions with substandard basic necessities. (Wolf, 2013, para. 3)
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Critics of private confinement facilities offer passionate arguments, but secure placements for youth
have always involved a mixture of public and private organizations and the role of private facilities
is growing relative to the role of public facilities. Public institutions provided the bulk of juvenile
confinement during most of the twentieth century, but private organizations became a substantial and
growing segment of the juvenile justice system in recent years. According to the newest federal data, the
number of delinquent youths placed by courts in privately operated secure facilities exceeds the number
placed in publicly operated state facilities, with facilities operated by local governments making up the
remainder (Puzzanchera, Hockenberry, Sladky, & Kang, 2018).
The prevalence of private providers in the juvenile justice system grew in the late twentieth century
for several reasons having little to do with the self-interest and greed of corporations. First, federal
policy governing juvenile justice changed in the 1970s with the passage of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. The law encouraged the use of diversion and community-based
interventions for youth involved in the justice system, and private programs became more acceptable
as a result. In 1970, according to federal statistics, juveniles in privately operated facilities accounted
for just 13% of all youth in long-term secure confinement. By 1979, only 5 years after passage of the
JJDP Act, private facilities held 48% of juveniles in long-term secure confinement facilities (Curran,
1988, p. 367). The average daily population reported by private confinement facilities grew from fewer
than 9,000 to nearly 31,000 youth between 1970 and 1979, whereas the number of youths in public
facilities declined from approximately 58,000 to 34,000 during the same period.
The trend toward private placements continued after the 1970s and generally did not attract the atten-
tion of juvenile justice advocates. Residential providers became more diverse, and private organizations
began to offer a broader range of interventions and treatment approaches. States also increased their
support for alternatives to confinement, especially for younger youth and those with emotional prob-
lems and mental health disorders. These policy changes were supported by a growing research literature
in the science of brain development, the increasing reliability of evaluation research on community-
based interventions, and a series of opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court that recognized the nature
of adolescent development and limited the use of purely retributive or punitive sanctions for youth
involved with the justice system (Bonnie et al., 2013; Feld, 2017).
As local governments and private providers assumed more responsibility for youth justice place-
ments, it may have helped to correct a long-standing fiscal anomaly that encouraged the use of state-
operated institutions. When most of the nation’s confinement institutions were operated by state gov-
ernments, city and county governments were typically required to pay for the youth they referred to
community-based interventions in their own jurisdictions, but confinement costs were borne by the
state. This encouraged local governments to take advantage of cost-shifting and fostered an inappro-
priate reliance on incarceration and higher overall costs. In addition, it did not improve public safety.
Research findings showed that incarceration by itself does not reduce recidivism and may even exacer-
bate other youth problems, such as family disruption, poor educational outcomes, unemployment, and
behavioral health issues (Mulvey, 2011).
As the demand for youth confinement continued to drop, many states reduced or closed their large
publicly operated institutions and relied instead on private facilities and facilities operated by local
governments, including detention centers originally designed to house youth during court proceedings
and those awaiting long-term placements. According to the federal census of juvenile residential facil-
ities, the number of public facilities declined significantly after the 1990s (Puzzanchera et al., 2018).
In 2000, there were 322 long-term secure facilities for adjudicated youth. By 2016, there were just 189
such facilities nationwide, indicating that 133 facilities had been closed or reclassified into something
other than long-term secure institutions (Table 1). Most of the nation’s long-term secure facilities for
youth were in just 10 states in 2016: Florida (30 facilities); California (22); Texas (19); Oregon (8);
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T A B L E 1 Number of long-term secure facilities for adjudicated youth offenders: 2000, 2016
Census Year
Location 2000 2016
United States Total 322 189
Texas 26 (1) 19 (3)
California 25 (2) 22 (2)
Florida 17 (3) 30 (1)
Ohio 17 (3) 7 (6)
New York 16 (5) 3
Pennsylvania 16 (5) 3
Michigan 14 (7) 4
Missouri 12 (8) 0
Indiana 11 (9) 1
Massachusetts 10 (10) 3
Oregon 9 8 (4)
Colorado 8 8 (4)
Minnesota 8 6 (7)
Georgia 7 6 (7)
Utah 6 5 (9)
Illinois 5 5 (9)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the rankings of the 10 states with the largest number of facilities.
Source. Adapted from the juvenile residential facility census (Puzzanchera et al., 2018).
Colorado (8); Ohio (7); Georgia (6); Minnesota (6); Illinois (5); and, Utah (5). Only Florida reported
more long-term secure facilities in 2016 than in 2000 (30 vs. 17). The other top-10 states in 2000
reported fewer long-term facilities in 2016.
These changes produced the differences seen today in the national profile of long-term facilities.
The decline in youth confinement was steepest among state-operated public facilities (Figure 2). In
1997, state facilities reported nearly 40,000 youth in placement under court commitment. By 2015,
the number of committed youths plummeted 70% to slightly less than 12,000. The number of youths
committed to private facilities also declined between 1997 and 2015 but to a lesser extent. Although
approximately 25,000 youth were reported among the commitment population in private facilities in
1997, the number of those youth dropped 48% by 2015, reaching a total slightly less than 13,000.
By 2015, the population of youth held under court commitment in privately operated confinement
facilities was larger than the number held in publicly operated state facilities (Figure 3). In 1997, 53%
of committed youth in long-term secure confinement were held in state facilities, whereas 34% were in
private facilities and the rest were in facilities operated by local governments. By 2015, the proportions
had switched: 42% of youth were confined in private facilities, whereas 38% were in state facilities and
20% were in local facilities.
4 IS PRIVATE ALWAYS BAD?
There are at least three specific reasons why private confinement facilities for juveniles may cause
concern. First, a point made in the adult context by the Israeli Supreme Court in its 2009 case Academic
BUTTS AND PFAFF 369
F I G U R E 2 Number of youth confined to long-term secure facilities declined significantly after 1997 [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. Data extracted from census of juveniles in residential placement (Sickmund et al., 2017)
F I G U R E 3 Youth confined in privately operated secure facilities now outnumber those held in state facilities
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. Data extracted from census of juveniles in residential placement (Sickmund et al., 2017)
Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance is that contracting with private entities to impose
punishment is fundamentally contrary to the state’s monopoly on punishment. Second, the profit motive
may be ill suited to advance rehabilitative goals. Third, closely related to the second reason, the profit
motive may be ill suited to encourage diversion from prison and from criminal justice exposure more
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broadly. Although all three reasons raise important concerns about private facilities, they are ultimately
not convincing.
The leading argument among privatization critics is usually one of delegation. Feeley (2014) argued
that the claims made in the Academic Center case posed a serious challenge (one he took on directly)
to those who defend privatization. In relying on philosophers from Hobbes and Locke to Walzer, the
opinion provided in the case argued that delegating so core a state function as punishment to a private,
financially motivated actor was a fundamental insult to a person’s liberty:
It can therefore be said that our position is that the scope of the violation of a prison
inmate’s constitutional right to personal liberty, when the entity responsible for his impris-
onment is a private corporation motivated by economic considerations of profit and loss,
is inherently greater than the violation of the same right of an inmate when the entity
responsible for his imprisonment is a government authority that is not motivated by those
considerations. (cited in Feeley, 2014, p. 1406)
Even if one accepted the normative argument—as well as the debatable idea that the “profit and loss”
distinction is a meaningful one—its application is weaker in the juvenile context. Although parens
patriae as a model of juvenile justice suffered during the civil rights era as well as the tough-on-crime
era, it has never been completely abandoned. Juvenile justice is still focused on rehabilitation, even
when a youth seems unsuited for diversion and adjudication seems likely, which is the moment when
the private-versus-public distinction matters the most. The fundamental rationale of juvenile jurisdic-
tion, at least in theory, is that young people are uniquely amenable to treatment and state authorities
should focus on rehabilitating rather than on punishing them for what are often adolescent-limited law
violations.
In other words, even though juvenile confinement is still a form of punishment (especially as experi-
enced by confined youth), the state’s explicit purpose is to help and support youth. The state frequently
compels parents to expose children to other treatments and practices without triggering concerns about
delegation. Children must be educated, and it is acceptable to send them to private schools. Children
must be vaccinated and receive adequate medical care, and the use of private hospitals is never ques-
tioned. The analogy, of course, is not a perfect one—in the case of schools and hospitals, many parents
are able to make choices,2 and they are not always told by the state which sort of institution to use. But,
as the discussion moves away from compulsory punishments to compulsory treatments, delegation-
based criticisms of private contracting begin to lose their punch. Again, at least in theory, juvenile
justice is closer to compulsory treatment than to punishment when compared with the adult system.3
Privatization and rehabilitation are often viewed as antithetical as well. Concerns about profit max-
imizing and cost-cutting are often invoked to argue that private prisons are incentivized to cut staffing
and programming to minimize per-inmate costs, decisions that obviously run contrary to rehabilitation.
Given that rehabilitation is even more central to juvenile justice than to adult justice, this would seem
to argue strongly against privatization. This framing, however, is a categorical error. The problem with
privatization is not an issue of profit maximization; it is an issue of contract incentives.
The standard cautionary tale of private prisons goes as follows. A state enters into a purchase-of-
services contract that will pay a prison some designated amount per prisoner per day. Prison admin-
istrators then have a strong incentive to reduce costs as far below the per diem as possible without
losing the contract. They scale back staff training, cut staffing size, minimize programming, reduce
rehabilitation options, and skimp on food and medical care. Each of these actions makes prisons even
more traumatic and more iatrogenic than they already are by design. This is acceptable for the prison
company as recidivism may increase revenues when the facility population grows. It also incentivizes
prison companies to lobby for tougher sanctions and against expanded parole, again to keep prisoner
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volume high. Moreover, if it earns profits, the company invests them outside the prison—any cost
savings do not benefit people incarcerated in the prison.
These are real concerns, but they apply both to the public and to the private sector. In Louisiana
recently, the legislature paid public sheriffs to hold state inmates in public jails. The sheriffs cut costs,
used the savings to fund their own departments (outside of the jails), and lobbied state lawmakers
to maintain sanctions to keep the cash flowing (Chang, 2012). The sheriffs acted with a financial
motive, but at least initially there were no private profits involved (although later in the process, the
legislature invited private prison companies to help the sheriffs build out their jail capacity to hold state
inmates). The process was motivated by one public-sector actor (county sheriffs) seeking to benefit
from confinement policies in coordination with another public sector actor (the state legislature).
Even without the involvement of private corporations, public officials sometimes expand the use of
incarceration for their own material motives. One of the authors was once in a meeting with the head of
a juvenile justice agency in a midsized state to discuss that state’s future needs for youth confinement
space. Based on statistical projections and research conducted by the author, the agency had decided
on a precise amount of new bed space that was requested from the legislature. Twenty minutes into
the meeting, the chairperson of the state senate appropriation committee called the agency director
and offered to fund twice as much space as had been requested. The juvenile justice director happily
accepted. When asked why, he shrugged and said, “I never turn down space; we may need it at some
point.” When public officials promote incarceration policies from which they benefit directly, either
through the acquisition of resources or greater political influence, this is not much different from the
policy distortions created when private prisons pursue profit at the expense of programmatic quality
and the cost-effectiveness of justice policy.
5 QUALITY CONTRACTS
Critics of private confinement facilities assume that private firms always place their own interests above
the interests of people in their custody. Indeed, there are numerous examples of abusive and degrad-
ing conditions in privately operated facilities. When subjected to the same scrutiny, however, public
facilities fare no better (Mendel, 2015; Schiraldi, 2015). The motives of profit and income may be cor-
rosive in private facilities, but public facilities respond to their own destructive motives, including the
political and budgetary power of legislative sponsors, bureaucratic and patronage benefits controlled
by administrators, and jobs. Especially when public facilities are unionized, the quality of services and
recidivism outcomes produced by the facility may not rank very high among the concerns of state and
local officials. Both public and private facilities can be abusive and wasteful. Both can also be man-
aged effectively and contribute to public safety goals by delivering high-quality services and behavioral
interventions.
The benefits of well-managed private facilities are easily overlooked when policy discussions are
focused on the dysfunctional ways that private companies sometimes pursue income and profit. Instead
of examining only the risks presented by privatization, policy makers should consider how to ensure
the effectiveness of private facilities by addressing contract incentives. The solution is clear: Make the
income of private providers depend on the success of their rehabilitation and public safety efforts, and
use performance contracts to establish the terms of the agreement.
Focusing on incentives moves the policy conversation beyond the narrow issues of private versus
public or profit versus nonprofit. If the challenge is not simply about privatization but about the harmful
incentives that encourage the misuse of confinement, policy makers approach the issue of private facil-
ities differently. If private juvenile facilities are harmful, it may not be a result of the incurable nature
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of privatization; it may be an issue amenable to improvements in the design and implementation of
contracts.
Improving the contracts of private providers would likely mean the elimination of contracts based on
simple per-diem payments. There is no inherent reason why contracts for private confinement facilities
must rely on per-diem costs to set payment amounts. Per-diem contracts likely exist because they are
easy to design and execute, but other models are possible. In fact, some jurisdictions are experimenting
with other contracting mechanisms, including those that use recidivism metrics to set payments—that
is, prison firms earn more when fewer released prisoners return to prison. The goal is to align the
firm’s self-interest with public safety goals. It may even be easier to improve incentives in the private
sector. Although contracts can be designed to target the motives of private providers and to focus their
efforts on public safety goals, it could be very difficult to adjust the incentives of politically appointed
administrators of public facilities with employees protected by public-sector unions.
Rather than paying private firms for providing “bed-days” of confinement space, contracts based
on the quality of services and the effects of programs for confined youth would track conditions in
the facility and the success of youth after their release. Recidivism-based incentive contracts are still
new in criminal justice, and few institutions are compensated using this device at present, but interest
is growing. In 2013, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections rewrote its contracts with private
firms managing the halfway houses that provide transitional residences for newly released inmates. To
incentivize recidivism reductions, the new contracts included bonuses for companies with recidivism
rates below a designated benchmark and penalized those with higher recidivism numbers. The early
results indicate the strategy may have desirable effects on recidivism (Gilroy, 2015).
Australia and New Zealand are also funding privately operated prisons with contracts centered on
reduced recidivism (Eisen, 2018; Rani, 2017). Some of the new institutions struggle at the start—
perhaps for idiosyncratic reasons4—but evidence exists that the new contract terms are successfully
motivating private providers to improve conditions for the people detained in their facilities (Eisen,
2018).
When done correctly, contracts for private providers might even ensure higher quality than public
facilities will ever be able to guarantee. Budget shortfalls at the state level recently impelled Florida
prison officials to cut their own programming for adult inmates, including substance-abuse services,
transitional housing, and reentry supports (Kam, 2018). States could write contracts for private insti-
tutions that legally compel them to provide services, even in economic downturns. Lacking the protec-
tions of formal contracts, prisons may be asked to degrade their own services to help solve the state’s
budget problems. Private contractors could not be asked to do the same.
To be fair, recidivism-based contracts are not without their challenges and perhaps the most
formidable is that the very metric on which they rest, “recidivism,” is a deeply problematic number.
Recidivism is not a simple measure of individual success or failure after justice intervention (Butts &
Schiraldi, 2018). It is a complex, bureaucratic indicator representing multiple layers of decision making
by justice officials. Recidivism measures reflect the focus and intensity of police activity and justice-
system controls. Because of varying levels of policing, prosecution, and sentencing across communities
in the United States, using recidivism as a key outcome measure inevitably disadvantages communities
of color. Moreover, recidivism represents the aggregate consensus of multiple actors and agencies in
the justice system, some of whom may be acting out of self-interest when they propel a youth deeper
into the justice process.
Also, it may be difficult to imagine how to align provider incentives when it comes to diversion.
A conventional argument against privatization is that—whether the goal is simple incarceration or
rehabilitation—private facilities cannot be compensated for people who are never referred for place-
ment. This concern is obviously a legitimate one. Private providers across the country, however, are
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increasingly embracing diversion and community-based interventions, and these are even becoming
growth areas (Holland, 2016). Yet even if the number of private providers in the community may con-
tinue to grow, their influence will always be overshadowed by the true centers of power in the justice
system: police, prosecutors, and courts.
Note, for example, that a youth’s referral to a confinement facility comes at the end of a long sequence
of decisions made by public-sector actors, with few opportunities for private providers to affect the
decisions. Before juveniles can be held in either public or private facilities, they first must be arrested
by a public-sector police officer5 and then charged by a public-sector prosecutor.6 Finally, they have
to be “sentenced” (i.e., have a juvenile court disposition imposed) by a public-sector judge or juvenile
court referee.7 This attenuating chain of decision making by public-sector actors thus limits the impact
of any lobbying by providers. Lobbying typically targets legislative bodies, and there are two types of
changes legislatures can push for in justice policy: criminalizing more youth behavior and increasing
the use of harsh sanctions. The latter is likely more common and could have more impact.8 Yet, the
actual effects of private companies lobbying for more extreme court outcomes is unclear and poorly
studied, especially in the juvenile justice context. As Stuntz (2004, p. 2554) explained when looking
at prosecutors:
Prosecutors are not like civil plaintiffs: they are not paid by the conviction, with bonuses
for each additional month the defendant spends in prison. [Thus] extra months in prison
are not like marginal dollars in civil cases. Once the defendant’s sentence has reached
the level the prosecutor prefers … adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecutor.
Indeed, prosecutors may actually value “extra” prison time negatively.
In other words, even if the private sector successfully pushes for longer sentences in general, pros-
ecutors (or judges) may not choose to send a young person to a juvenile facility in the first place, or
for a longer period than they otherwise would have. The same logic likely applies to police who may
base their arrest decisions on the expected time a potential arrestee faces (Washburn, 2017)—but that
is an expectation that turns far more on what prosecutors and judges are going to do than on what the
legislature has said they are allowed to.
Furthermore, the key question about lobbying by private providers is not “will they press for tougher
laws and the use of restrictive sanctions?” (they will), but “what will their marginal contribution be,
given that the public sector traditionally pushes for tough sanctions as well?” Often lost in complaints
about the private sector’s incentives to push for tougher sanctions are the public-sector incentives,
which are similarly motivated but on a much larger scale. Take the idea of “profit.” Yes, private prisons
seek to protect their profits, which come to several hundred million per year nationwide (adult, juvenile,
immigrant detention; state and federal alike—see Wagner & Rabuy, 2017).9 But approximately two
thirds of the $50 billion spent on prisons in the United States—or ∼$30 billion—goes to public-sector
staff wages and benefits (Mai & Subramanian, 2017). That gives public-sector unions strong incentives
to fight against any justice reforms that could jeopardize their members’ wages.
Public-sector political “profits” also exist. Politicians with correctional facilities in their districts,
for example, often see prisons and other correctional facilities as vital to the community’s economic
health (Eason, 2017)—which they value as a public good but also for their own political survival.
Having too few prisoners could lead to the risk of prison closures, the loss of well-paying jobs, and
population drain. Other, more complex political profits include the impact of “prison gerrymandering,”
the process by which inmates lose the right to vote but are counted for the purposes of districting as
living in the prison, not in the place they resided before detention. Youth confined in juvenile facilities
are often too young to vote, but counting them as living in (often rural) facilities still shifts political
power to more remote, less urban areas and away from the more urban areas where many young people
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live prior to their confinement—and thus, it shifts political power away from more Democratic cities
toward more Republican, less-urbanized areas. In other words, the public sector is already a significant
barrier to reform even in the total absence of private-sector lobbying (Pfaff, 2016).
Finally, it may be easier to close private facilities when populations drop than it is to reduce or close
public facilities. Private facilities can be closed by simply declining to renew a contract, whereas public
closures involve more complicated legislative responses. Public facility staff are also more likely to be
unionized—cheaper labor is one of the ways private firms cut costs—which makes it harder to end
their employment and close their facilities, and which implies that closures aimed at public facilities
face better organized and better funded opposition. The ease of facility closure is not a trivial issue.
Although no rigorous research has been conducted on this issue, it is likely that a state’s incapacitation
“capacity” can affect judicial decision making. The more beds that are available when facilities remain
open despite declines in the confined population, the more judges may be willing to refer juveniles for
secure placement and the more willing officials may be to keep them there for longer periods. Thus,
keeping partially empty facilities open may introduce other types of risk. On the other hand, the relative
ease with which privately operated facilities can be closed may suggest that systems made up mainly
of private facilities could be more conducive to supporting expansive juvenile treatment and diversion
approaches, especially as the number of juveniles in confinement continues to decline nationwide.
6 CONCLUSION
Political conversations about the problem of mass incarceration in the United States often include
references to the corrosive effects of private prisons. Whether prisons are operated by nonprofit orga-
nizations or for-profit companies, advocates and reformers suspect that privately operated prisons feed
the nation’s addiction to incarceration and line the pockets of corrupt public officials who favor puni-
tive approaches to criminal justice in part for their own financial and political benefit. Juvenile justice
reformers adopt this perspective when they criticize policy makers for using privately operated facili-
ties for young people in the juvenile justice process.
If private youth facilities are indeed harmful or somehow inappropriate, juvenile justice advocates
and reformers are correct to target them for criticism or outright abolition. For several reasons, more
justice-involved youth are now held in privately operated secure facilities than are confined in state-
operated public facilities across the United States. Private facilities, however, are most likely not inher-
ently more harmful than publicly operated facilities. It is certainly appropriate to identify and address
the incentives that may compel courts and communities to place more juveniles in locked facilities than
can be justified by public safety concerns, but this applies equally to public and private confinement
facilities.
The difference between public and private financing is only one factor to consider in judging youth
confinement facilities. Other and perhaps more important considerations include the consistency, qual-
ity, and developmental suitability of programming; the safety of the facility environment; and the over-
all professionalism of facility staff and management. These concerns are readily amenable to the terms
of operational contracts for youth facilities. Juvenile justice advocates should focus on the design,
implementation, and monitoring of contracts for youth facilities instead of judging them only by their
financing mechanisms.
ENDNOTES
1 Judicial decisions about final case outcomes in juvenile court are called “dispositions,” which is analogous to sentences
in criminal court.
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2 Wealthy parents at least may be able to exercise choice. Parents with less economic power are generally com-
pelled to rely on public institutions, although the rise of charter schools—contested perhaps as a matter of policy
but not of democratic legitimacy—indicates that the state is allowed to contract out unavoidable services to private
contractors.
3 As Feeley (2014) pointed out, the Academic Center case never touched on the issue of private juvenile facilities, speaking
only of adult institutions. Feeley suggested privatization may be more accepted in the juvenile context. That said, the
delegation argument has more weight when we acknowledge that, whatever the rhetoric, the juvenile justice system is
expressly punitive (Feld, 2017). In that case, however, it is still worth asking whether the policy solution should be to
devise better ways to rehabilitate rather than simply conceding that the juvenile justice system is merely a reconfiguration
of the punitive adult system (and taking juvenile confinement as a given, putting aside for this article any discussion of
whether that should be abolished more broadly).
4 Australia’s privately run Melaleuca Remand and Reintegration Facility was given just 4 months of preparation before
beginning operations. An outgoing government rushed to open the prison before ceding power. The contract suffered
from serious limitations, and the facility was fined multiple times for noncompliance as a result (Hickey, 2018).
5 Some nuance is important here. One underappreciated fact of policing—one that indicates many studies of the impact
of policing on crime comprise serious measurement error—is that more than half of all police in the United States are
private security (Heaton, Hunt, MacDonald, & Saunders, 2016). Although a formal arrest still requires the intervention
of a public police officer, the initial detention can be made by private security, and there is little empirical understanding
of how often these initial detention decisions by private-security firms translate into (public) arrests.
6 Other complications may apply. As of 2007, the most recent available data, ∼15% of counties (mostly small juris-
dictions) did not have full time prosecutors, but instead they contracted with private lawyers to provide prosecutorial
services (Perry & Banks, 2011). Where contracts are poorly written, this could create serious moral hazard problems.
Contracts do not always include a cap on fees, which can encourage (private) prosecutors to file excessive charges
(Deere, 2016).
7 Unlike most police and prosecutors, there is no private-sector equivalent for a judge. It is true that there has been at
least one high-profile corruption case in which a public judge in Pennsylvania accepted bribes from private juvenile
prisons to send children to those facilities (Peralta, 2011), but such cases seem rare (Feeley, 2014).
8 Despite all the talk of “overcriminalization,” the reality is that the criminal justice system is driven by arrests, prosecu-
tions, and convictions for conduct that long has been viewed as criminal and is widely accepted as criminal (Richman
& Stuntz, 2005). Mislabeling overly thick pasta as spaghetti may be a federal crime (21 USC §§331, 343(g) & 21 CFR
§139.125(c)), but no one is in federal prison for felonious spaghetti-labeling.
9 It is widely cited that private prisons are a “$5 billion per year industry” (see, e.g., Eisen, 2017b; The Week Staff, 2018),
but that is revenue, not profit, and profit drives behavior. If private prisons had to spend $6 billion to get that $5 billion,
they would likely leave the industry.
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